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UBIQUITOUS PRIVACY
THOMAS P. CROCKER*
Privacy does not name a single value, practice, or principle. It has
multiple meanings and appears in different contexts and guises.1 It depends
on background social and political practices and values, varying with time,
intensity, salience, and scale, among other conditions.2 For example, small
amounts of information, not salient to important decisions that do not reveal
very intense preferences or events in a person’s life, and are small in scale
within a person’s life history, might not be very private, whereas large
amounts of information, salient to important personal decisions, revealing
deeply important information about a person’s identity, could be highly
private. The relative weights and measures regarding these factors are a
strong, but not determinative, indicator of the degree of privacy to afford
information. Measuring privacy, given the array of potential factors, is
therefore both contextual and contingent. We can weigh and measure
privacy in different manners.3
To take one example from Supreme Court jurisprudence, writing for a
majority in Kyllo v. United States, Justice Scalia concludes that when police
use infrared technology to view the relative heat dispersal of the outer walls
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. For
helpful conversations on these issues, I would like to thank Marc Blitz, Josh Eagle, Andrew
Ferguson, Susan Freiwald, David Gray, Stephen Henderson, and Christopher Slobogin.
Stephen Henderson deserves special thanks for starting and organizing the conversation. I
am grateful for the research assistance of Andrew Webb and Adam Mandell.
1. See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND
THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 2-3 (2010); Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1099-1124 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy]
(considering privacy as the right to be left alone, to limit access to the self, to secrecy, to
control over personal information, to protect dignity and autonomy, and to develop
intimacy); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 484-91 (2006);
James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1153 (2004); Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L. J.
2087, 2087 (2001) (reviewing JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF
PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2000)) (“Privacy is a value so complex, so entangled in competing
and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various and distinct meanings, that I
sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at all.”).
2. See generally Whitman, supra note 1.
3. But these manners are not unrelated. They have conceptual similarities and overlaps.
Nonetheless, there are no necessary or sufficient criteria that all examples of privacy share.
See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 66-67 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 1958); Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 1, at 1096-99.
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of a home, they learn too much about the intimate details of the home.4 By
contrast, Justice Stevens, writing in dissent, argues that such “off the wall”
surveillance implicates no constitutional privacy interests.5 Justice Scalia
focuses on the intimate household details that the technology might reveal,
such as when “the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath,”6
whereas Justice Stevens focuses on what he construes as the superficial
information already exposed to the general public.7 This disagreement is
about where the boundaries are drawn between what information the state
might acquire and what information persons are entitled to keep to
themselves, even if exposed to others for limited purposes and in specific
circumstances. This disagreement depends on judgments about the role
information plays within a person’s life. Control over informational aspects
of personal life is part of what it means to have and develop a person’s own
identity. What many different approaches to the relative weights and
measures of privacy have in common is that privacy is understood to
implicate the conditions for realizing personal identity. Privacy is a matter
of establishing the boundaries between self and other. These boundaries
become especially significant when the other is an official of the state.
By analyzing privacy as a value disconnected from the persons in whom
it inheres, it is often easier to tradeoff other, equally abstracted values, such
as security. Questions about how to conceptualize, and thus whether to
protect, privacy in the information persons share with third parties produce
different answers if approached from the perspective of personal identity,
rather than from the perspective of law enforcement practice. At the very
least, such a perspective will require more attention to the practical
implications of police action than will conclusory Supreme Court assertions
that a holding considering only the interests of police provides “ample
protection for the privacy rights that the [Fourth] Amendment protects.”8
Because the conditions in which persons develop and sustain their identities
are diverse and polymorphic, so too will be the occasions and practices in
which privacy is a value. As a consequence, legal conclusions about
privacy both arise out of, and give shape to, social practices.
As a conceptual matter, before determining the degree of protection to
afford privacy, a decision maker may first have to classify the effects of law
enforcement’s access to particular kinds of information. By first deciding
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 38-40 (2001).
Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 38.
Id. at 43-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011).
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the level of privacy that particular kinds of information warrant, a decision
maker can then determine how much procedure to impose on law
enforcement officials seeking access. Categorizing internet search histories
or a person’s public movements, for example, as private to a high or
minimal degree will guide further decisions about how much constraint to
place on law enforcement’s ability to access such information. One such
example, provided by the 2013 ABA Standards for Law Enforcement
Access to Third Party Records (LEATPR Standards), is to offer a sliding
scale ranging from highly private information to moderate, minimal, or
non-private information.9 Focusing on the nature of the information and its
use, the ABA Standards ask the following: whether sharing is necessary to
meaningful participation in modern society, whether information is
personal and intimate, whether information is ordinarily accessible to
parties other than those with whom a person has shared, and whether
existing law establishes baseline rules about access to shared information.10
Questions about which information is private and what level of protection is
appropriate require interpretive decisions open to debate and disagreement.
But the need to make a decision is unavoidable.
To forego adopting an explicit framework to determine the procedures
by which law enforcement may gain access to third party records is to make
a decision about law enforcement access. Default rules and practices will
otherwise govern and guide policing practice. Moreover, in deciding on
privacy, classifications will influence social and political practices, which
in turn will inform how classificatory schema are implemented. The current
legal approach, in the absence of comprehensive guidance, provides
fragmentary regulation, leaving many kinds of data uncovered.11 As a
result, individuals often have the burden of maintaining their own privacy
by withholding information or foregoing transactions that are otherwise
conditions of everyday life. In this way, privacy receives protection through
a form of withholding or nondisclosure—a retreat to the self-contained
9. The Standards choose a four-category classification, sliding from highly private
information to moderately, minimally, or non-private information. See ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LAW ENFORCEMENT ACCESS TO THIRD PARTY RECORDS 25-4.1 (2013)
[hereinafter LEATPR STANDARDS]. Individual standards will be referred to using the format
‘Standard x-x.’
10. STANDARD 25-4.1(a)-(d).
11. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3402 (2012) (financial records); 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (2012)
(health records). See generally Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice
System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement
Exemptions, 111 MICH. L. REV. 485 (2013) (analyzing the interaction between statutory
protections and the Fourth Amendment).
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aspects of personal identity. But is nondisclosure really the privacy of
personal identity?
We give the name “privacy” to an overlapping set of practices and
concerns that shape the conditions in which we realize our personal
identities. These practices are social. They are shared with others in all the
familiar as well as more distant relations persons maintain as conditions of
a complete life. In this way, persons share information with others widely
and to varying degrees. But they also maintain a claim of privacy regarding
much of this information and many of these associations, despite the limited
disclosures they make. In this way, privacy is not about being alone, but
about the conditions under which persons relate to others.
Because law is not neutral regarding the shape these practices and
relations among persons and their information take, this article focuses on
three overlapping considerations. Part I addresses the question of how to
weigh and measure the relative degree of privacy maintained in particular
kinds of information. A default position is to think that information held
more closely to the chest is the paradigm of privacy, while what is more
loosely guarded is public and fair game. Such a view is consistent with the
surveillance practices of repressive regimes and cautions reconsideration of
how decision makers weigh and measure more shallow forms of personal
information. Part II considers how the ubiquity of third party information
entails a similar ubiquity of privacy. If, as a condition for leading a
complete life, persons share information for limited purposes in diverse
contexts, then privacy’s location in legal and conceptual space depends on
choices decision makers must make. Treating third party information as
highly or minimally private does not follow deductively from the nature of
the information itself, separated from the practices in which it functions. In
choosing whether and how to protect diverse instantiations of privacy, it is
important to consider the constitutional meanings and related values of
association and speech. Part III explores the constitutional and conceptual
aspects of privacy, concluding that law enforcement access to third party
records should be constrained by a higher showing of relevance and need
the more such access impacts core values of association, expression, and
personal identity. The mere fact of widespread social sharing does not entail
a conclusion that cyberspaces are no different than public streetscapes.
I. Privacy’s Weights and Measures
Václav Havel, former Czech Republic President and playwright,
described how in pre-1989 Czechoslovakia in the face of pervasive
surveillance, “[i]ndependent thinking and creation retreated to the trenches
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of deep privacy.”12 By referring to the trenches of “deep privacy,” Havel
suggested that there is a quality of privacy to which the individual under
surveillance, chilled from creative and associational activities, might
retreat.13 The question is whether “in a world of ubiquitous third party
information,”14 as the LEATPR Standards identify the present state of
affairs, deep privacy provides a safe retreat. A common view, adopted by
courts and scholars, is that privacy is defined by what is withheld from
others—what is kept secret is often something deeply private.15 What is
revealed to others is something made public and therefore to be contrasted
with what is private.16 Thus, on the view adopted in Supreme Court
opinions, deep privacy is a primary form of constitutionally protected
privacy. For, as the Court has made clear, a person assumes the risk that in
sharing information with a third party, law enforcement may thereby
become the unexpected recipients.17 Havel’s understanding of “deep
privacy” as a retreat from ordinary forms of expressive human interaction
within a polity, however, suggests that such a form of privacy is inadequate
to protect human freedom.18 Reliance on deep privacy to protect
independent thinking from the potential for pervasive government
interference and intrusion on citizens’ liberties through constant
12. VÁCLAV HAVEL, DISTURBING THE PEACE 120 (Paul Wilson trans., 1991).
13. Id.
14. STANDARD 25-3.1 commentary.
15. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.”); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 393
(1978) (“[O]ne aspect of privacy is the withholding or concealment of information.”);
William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV.
1016, 1025 (1995) (“[O]ne fairly well-defined and fairly narrow interest, the interest in
secrecy, seems predominant.”).
16. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (commenting on the
public nature of contraband in a fenced yard, the Court noted that “[a]ny member of the
public flying in this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these
officers observed”).
17. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979) (“When he used his phone,
petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and
‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing,
petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he
dialed.”); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (“[A person] takes the risk, in
revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be conveyed by that person to the
Government.”).
18. Havel suggests that the political state triggering a retreat into “deep privacy” was
“an attack by the totalitarian system on life itself, on the very essence of human freedom and
integrity.” HAVEL, supra note 12, at 128.
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surveillance is a deficient mode of privacy protection. The problem with
this retreat is that deep privacy is not associational, interactive, open, or
interpersonal. It does not rely on the reciprocal interaction of self-disclosure
essential to realizing personal identity.19 Since it is not part of any shared
discourse, what is retained as deep privacy may not even count as
information. Deep privacy supports neither the associational activities
necessary to developing one’s distinct personal identity, nor the interactions
thought necessary for engaged citizenship.20
Deep privacy reveals who a person may be when left alone with her
thoughts, but personal knowledge and identity also require a form of what
can be called “shallow privacy” to give experience and understanding to a
person’s deep privacy. Shallow privacy can include information that could
be classified as both highly private and minimally private, or even nonprivate, because shallow privacy is less about the nature of the information
than it is about the relation of information to a person’s core identity.
Medical records about a person’s severe contusion suffered while
snowboarding may be classified as highly private, but may also be
relatively shallow in what they reveal about a person’s core self-identity.
Third parties discovering that a person suffered a snowboarding injury may
not learn anything a person would not readily reveal herself. Minimally
private categories of information, say a person’s present or historical
movements on city streets, might nonetheless be highly private. A person
19. It is beyond the scope of this essay to enter into philosophical debate about the
necessary conditions for the possibility of personal identity and development. On the degree
to which questions of justice, for example, depend on individuals understood in relative
isolation or in community, one can see the debate between JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971) and MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982).
But, perhaps this much can be asserted here: a central feature of privacy is the fact of a
person’s relations to others. The boundaries of that relation are, in turn, essential to forming
and sustaining a person’s identity within society. See also infra note 24 and accompanying
text.
20. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 244 (1995)
(“[W]e might hope that a well-functioning system of free expression will ultimately
encourage a degree of public virtue and produce high levels of participation and genuine
deliberation.”); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 39 (1967) (suggesting that privacy
“is basically an instrument for achieving individual goals of self-realization”); see also
Bruce Ackerman, Reviving Democratic Citizenship, 41 POL. & SOC’Y 309, 310 (2013)
(outlining a participatory and deliberative “citizenship agenda”); Ruth Gavison, Privacy and
the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 455 (1980); (“Privacy . . . encourages the moral
autonomy of the citizen, a central requirement of a democracy.”); Martin H. Redish, The
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 603-04 (1982) (promoting the democratic
value of individual self-realization).
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attending a job interview about which a current employer is unaware might
hold this information to be highly private—not data for public knowledge.
Such information may be central to a person’s present identity—revealing
ambitions and dissatisfactions not apparent to other third party sources,
though perhaps known to intimates. In this way, information about a
person’s more shallow forms of privacy can tell us something about the
deeper recesses of his ambitions and desires.
The contingent and contextual depth of specific information and the
weight a person might attach to it, makes regulating based on classifications
more difficult. It may be that no classificatory framework will completely
fit actual practices and will thus both over- and underprotect information.
Overprotection occurs when policies grant a high degree of protection to
information persons may not think very private, while underprotection
occurs when those same policies fail to protect other information a person
might hold dear. From the perspective of privacy, any classificatory scheme
is likely to be incomplete, given the complexity and contingency of private
information. Law enforcement will agree with this claim of imperfect fit,
though for different reasons. From the perspective of law enforcement, the
worry is not whether information vital to the realization of personal identity
is revealed, but whether information thought necessary to effective crime
investigation and prevention will be more difficult to obtain.21 Thus,
pressures on classifications exist from both sides. Individuals objecting to
law enforcement snooping and police seeking technologically enhanced
access to information may both find reason to pressure decision makers.
Because the relationship between shallow and deep privacy is important
to the development and maintenance of personal identity, imperfections in
the weights and measures of privacy can have effects on other
constitutional values. For example, constructive access to third party
records allows law enforcement officials to interfere with the relation
between shallow and deep privacy in a way that can be iniquitous to selfrealization, a value often praised and protected under the First
Amendment.22 By subjecting people to “too permeating police

21. See, e.g., STANDARD 25-4.2 (giving legislatures the option of reducing protections
on certain types of information if “the limitation imposed [by the Standards] would render
law enforcement unable to solve or prevent an unacceptable amount of otherwise solvable or
preventable crime”).
22. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 763 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(“The individual must keep some facts concerning his thoughts within a small zone of
people. At the same time he must be free to pour out his woes or inspirations or dreams to
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surveillance”23 of their shallow privacy, the interactions that make
realization of deep privacy possible may be suppressed or even foreclosed,
rendering vulnerable the processes of deep identity formation and
maintenance. Persons must have interactions of shallow privacy in order to
form the core of deep privacy.24 Knowing that one’s social media
interactions may be subject to indiscriminate police surveillance may alter a
person’s decisions about what to share.25 At the moment a person selfcensors because of a risk that a zealous police officer might misconstrue
what she says or view what is intended only for friends, then a permeating
surveillance has chilled First Amendment protected activity.26 In this way,
regulation of police access to third party records implicates constitutional
values of both privacy and association. And, in each case, protecting
privacy requires classifying information with attention to how it is used and
how it relates to other practices.
To be fair, there are many reasons a person might choose to edit and alter
what she says to different audiences. We all self-censor. We present
ourselves in varying ways in light of differential social circumstances and
our roles within them.27 Advocates for greater law-enforcement access to
others. . . . This is the essence of the idea of privacy implicit in the First and . . . Fourth
[Amendments].”); see also Redish, supra note 20, at 604.
23. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
24. Interactions with and attachments to others play roles in forming a self, as
philosophers have argued. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 221 (2d ed.
1984) (“For the story of my life is always embedded in the story of those communities from
which I derive my identity.”); CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN
SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 2, at 187, 209 (1985) (“[O]ur identity is always partly
defined in conversation with others or through the common understanding which underlies
the practices of our society.”); BERNARD WILLIAMS, MORAL LUCK: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS
1973-1980, at 14 (1981) (arguing that the conception of morality “depends on the idea of
one person’s having a character, in the sense of having projects and categorical desires with
which that person is identified”); see also, Erving Goffman, The Nature of Deference and
Demeanor, 58 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 473, 493 (1956) (“[T]he individual must rely on others
to complete the picture of him of which he himself is allowed to paint only certain parts.”).
25. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 108 (2008) (“Surveillance can
lead to self-censorship and inhibition.”); Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lies: Informational
Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1423-28 (2000); Susan Freiwald,
First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3; Neil M. Richards,
The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013).
26. See Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967)
(“[T]he danger of that chilling effect upon the exercise of virtual First Amendment rights
must be guarded against . . . .”); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment:
Unraveling the “Chilling Effect”, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978).
27. See ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 17-76 (1959).
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third party information might argue that adding one more factor to our
existing reasons for selective self-disclosure may be of minimal
consequence. Indeed, when talking about criminal activity, a person always
assumes a risk of speaking to a confidential informant.28 We all assume the
risk that when we share information with others they will in turn share our
information with law enforcement.29 But, there is a difference between the
self-censorship that is inseparable from social interaction and the state’s
subtle alteration of the forms of those same interactions.
By intruding upon the forms of shallow privacy, state officials can
thereby subtly alter the conditions under which forms of deep privacy are
shaped. When people know that pervasive surveillance is possible, they
may alter their behavior to conform to perceived norms and expectations
that otherwise would not apply.30 In a world of widespread surveillance,
persons do not need confirmation that they are currently being watched to
alter their behavior, which in turn can be internalized to change their
beliefs. Justice Douglas first sounded this note in dissents from the Court’s
third party and confidential informant doctrines, arguing that “[m]onitoring,
if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and spontaneous utterances.”31
Without free discourse, individuals will not have the liberty necessary for
realizing personal identity and engaging in self-government.32 Because
government monitoring of both deep and shallow privacy interactions can
lead to subtle alterations of both social forms and norms, it is important to
examine how information sharing works within social practices. And for
28. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 750 (1971).
29. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966) (“‘The risk of being overheard
by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or deceived as to the identity of one with
whom one deals is probably inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk
we necessarily assume whenever we speak.’” (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427,
465 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting))).
30. Jeremy Bentham first introduced the idea of the panopticon in the eighteenth
century. See JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PANOPTICON WRITINGS 29-95 (Miran Bozoic ed., Verso
1995) (1787). Michel Foucault explores the panoptic effect as a general way that society
disciplines individual behavior. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH
OF THE PRISON 207-08 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977). Most recently, Justice Scalia objected in
dissent to the idea of creating a “genetic panopticon.” Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958,
1989 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority held that collecting DNA samples from
those arrested for serious offenses is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1980.
31. White, 401 U.S. at 762 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
32. Justice Douglas also warned that “when the most confidential and intimate
conversations are always open to eager, prying ears . . . privacy, and with it liberty, will be
gone.” Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 354 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also
Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609 (1999).
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this analysis, recitations of what risks persons assume in sharing
information with others do not reveal much about why we must assume
these risks or what the effects of law enforcement access will be on social
practices. Moreover, claims about assumed risk are circular because we all
assume the risks courts or legislatures sanction and impose through the
privacy rules they create.33
Perhaps from a social welfare perspective, subtle alternations in the
patterns of sharing are nonetheless optimal given the social value that might
accrue from law enforcement’s ready access to large amounts of minimally
private information. So long as the intrusions are proportional to law
enforcement needs, why be concerned about pervasive surveillance of data
already publicly observable by others? Such a question is premised on
understanding privacy as undisclosed or secret, smuggling into the
discussion a fixed, and narrow, conception of privacy to be measured
against the social welfare goals of crime prevention and investigation. But,
as should be clear, privacy is more than the content of undisclosed deep
privacy. What is in question here is whether intrusions on forms of shallow
privacy have harmful effects of a similar magnitude as harms to deeper
forms of privacy, from the perspective of personal identity. Both the
quantity and quality of information accessible, absent regulation for
relatively shallow forms of privacy, have costs that are more difficult to
measure, but in the aggregate no less real.
In constitutional discourse, gesturing is sometimes sufficient. In First
Amendment jurisprudence, a background principle is that more speech is
better,34 that debate about matters of public importance “should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,”35 that “no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox,”36 and that “freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think”37 are indispensable to self-governance. These
33. See, e.g., White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Our expectations, and the
risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and
values of the past and present.”).
34. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (“That the air may at times seem
filled with verbal cacophony is, in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength.”);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“[T]he remedy
to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence.”), overruled in part by Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
35. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
36. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any
fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion . . . .”).
37. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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gestures become the bedrock meanings of free speech, not subject to further
welfarist balancing. By contrast, there is a comparably less than robust
background principle that more privacy is always better; for in the hidden
recesses of social life lies the potential for disorder that sometimes erupts
into visible social decay of the kind that “broken windows” policing seeks
to forestall.38 Thus, articulations of privacy often imbed a form of balancing
that already takes into account the security or policing needs of the state.39
But if more privacy is not always better, it does not follow that present
understandings of policing practices should uncritically shape everyday
political and social life. To focus legal analysis on enabling suspicionless
access to third party records risks ignoring other values that zealous pursuit
of order and security impact. As Charles Reich observed in the midst of the
Warren Court’s project of constitutionalizing criminal procedure, “The
good society must have its hiding places—its protected crannies for the
soul.”40 Under the First Amendment, one of the reasons for protecting
speech against official interference is that persons must remain free to form
their own opinions and perspectives in pursuit not only of their own
identities, but also of collective self-determination.41 Under the Fourth
Amendment, one of the central values of privacy is that persons must retain
the liberty to form their own personal identities through acts of both sharing
and withholding information and spaces.42 As Justice Brandeis argued,

38. See generally James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29-30. Under the broken windows theory, police focus on lowlevel crime and social disorder, aiming both to forestall the development of more serious
crime and to reinforce social norms of law-abidingness and social order. Id.
39. See Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 303
(2010) [hereinafter Crocker, Political Fourth Amendment].
40. Charles Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L. J. 1161,
1172 (1966).
41. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405,
1415-16 (1986).
42. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990) (protecting privacy of
overnight guest in the host’s home); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53 (1967) (protecting
private conversations because “‘[t]he basic purpose of [the Fourth] Amendment . . . is to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials’” (quoting Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523,
528 (1967))); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also Thomas P. Crocker, From
Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2009)
[hereinafter Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty].
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“The makers of our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.”43
The “self” of First Amendment self-determination is the person whose
privacy the Fourth Amendment protects. This Fourth Amendment value
sets a constitutional background against which legislatures and executive
officials can form more refined policies and classificatory frameworks for
regulating police access to third party records. To bring these values to the
foreground makes it possible to better measure what might be lost to
practices that further entrench the ability for police to access social media
records with minimal or no showing of individualized suspicion.
What the distinction between deep and shallow privacy reveals is that the
depths and measures of privacy are contingent and contextual. Privacy
descriptions are also defeasible. As a result, decision makers armed with
classificatory frameworks, looking to judge third party records as highly or
minimally private, should be attuned to descriptions of how privacy works
within social practices. Remembering who is to receive privacy protections
and why are as important as classifying what information counts as private.
And what counts as private depends on consideration of how information
functions in practice, not merely on whether, or how, it is shared.
II. Privacy’s Locations
Whether we designate information or relations to third parties as
implicating “deep” or “shallow” privacy, privacy is everywhere. Thus,
because privacy is so all-pervasive, it is difficult to provide analytic order to
needed legal protections. We all share enormous amounts of information
with others as conditions of everyday life. Such sharing is always within
contextual boundaries. A transaction with a bank is a type of information
sharing not meant to be a matter further shared. An opinion expressed on a
social media platform is information often intended only for a particular
circle friends, not for general dissemination. One’s preferences for products
are shared with merchants, one’s buying habits are observable to credit
providers, one’s energy use is observed by utility providers, and one’s
health care information is shared with physicians and insurers—to name
just a few of the ways data is shared and collected with the third parties
with whom we transact. In addition, we regularly share the numbers we dial
and the email addresses to which we send messages. We also share our

43. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled in part by Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
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continuous location to various phone and internet providers, as well as to
application services for mobile and cloud computing.
Given the prevalence of all this data, there are now additional businesses
that collect and collate our information for other interested parties wanting
to know more about who we are and what our habits might be—a
ubiquitous surveillance of personal reputations to determine whether to
extend credit, market goods, or offer a lease, among other uses.44 With all
of this sharing, it is easy to conclude that we readily and regularly give
away our privacy. Nonetheless, sharing is contextual and contingent.
Sharing can be enabled or burdened by law. Persons share limited
information with others for specific purposes. The fact that such
information might be used otherwise does not undermine the reasons for
understanding an exchange as contextually private. Indeed, such contextual
understandings often inform whether we view subsequent uses of personal
information as legitimate or harmful.
Privacy’s ubiquity complements its polysemy—it takes many different
meanings and implicates many different roles and aspects of our lives.45 As
the LEATPR Standards note more than once, “[W]e now live in a world of
ubiquitous third party information”46 that seems to match the ubiquity of
our interactions—be they commercial or personal—in multiple settings
with a diverse array of others. The mere existence of pervasive third party
information does not settle the question of personal privacy. Social norms
can shape legal understandings and practices. In turn, legal practices can
shape social meaning.47 In this dynamic, the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence provides constitutional meaning to privacy that
44. See, e.g., Alice E. Marwick, How Your Data Are Being Deeply Mined, N.Y. REV. OF
BOOKS, Jan. 9, 2014, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/how-your-dataare-being-deeply-mined/; Charles Duhigg, Psst, You in Aisle 5, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2012,
at MM30, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html.
See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET (2008); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How
ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law
Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Reputation Nation: Law in an Era of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV.
1667 (2008).
45. See generally Ronald J. Krotozynski, Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 IND. L.J. 881
(2013); Post, supra note 1; Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 1, at 1099-1124.
46. LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 2; STANDARD 25-3.1 commentary.
47. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (discussing a move away from legal means dispute resolution in
favor of informal means); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 943 (1995).
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influences the possibilities for the legislative reforms that the LEATPR
Standards contemplate.
One significant conceptual barrier to creating a Fourth Amendment
framework for addressing the dual ubiquities of privacy and third party
information is the Supreme Court’s decision to narrow the scope of privacy
to mean little more than secrecy through its construction of the third party
doctrine.48 Thus, the first hurdle to addressing the relation of these dual
ubiquities is to do more, and go further than the Supreme Court to protect
privacy in self-disclosure.49 In this way, legislative initiatives can lead the
way in a project Justice Sotomayor argued may be necessary. In United
States v. Jones, Justice Sotomayor suggested that the Court may need to
reconsider its adherence to the third party doctrine because “this approach
is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out
mundane tasks.”50 In important ways, the creative refashioning that must
continually recur to match judicial doctrines crafted during an age of the
rotary telephone to social practices in the digital age is no different than the
work of reconsidering the third party doctrine to give renewed meaning to
the values of liberty and privacy the Fourth Amendment protects.
In disclosing limited information to others in specific contexts and for
particular purposes, individuals maintain a large measure of privacy. Yet if
Fourth Amendment doctrine treats secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy,
then it remains conceptually unmoored from important conceptions of
privacy as well as from widespread social practices. Privacy implicates
practices of sharing more than withholding, for the liberty of engaging in
everyday life is a liberty to associate with others governed by social norms
established through social interaction. To understand privacy as more than
secrecy will make it possible for courts to analyze the divisible ways
48. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (“It is well settled that
when an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his
confidant will reveal that information to the authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit governmental use of that information.”); Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966).
49. The Standards propose shifting the focus, claiming that “privacy is not secrecy.”
STANDARD 25-4.1(a) commentary.
50. 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also, Aya Gruber,
Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is Made Of?, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 781, 805-816 (2008); Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the
Fourth Amendment Third-Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 431, 454-57 (2013); Paul
Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L. J. 1309, 1330-36
(2012).
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privacy matters to everyday life. As Havel suggests, deep privacy is not a
desirable retreat from the world of pervasive surveillance.51 Deep privacy
may be a necessary condition for the development of personal identity, but
it is far from sufficient.
Another significant conceptual hurdle to understanding the relationship
between privacy and third party records is the constant tendency to retreat
to a version of deep privacy as the paradigm against which we measure the
intrusiveness of law enforcement access. So long as some form of deep
privacy captures our imagination as what must really be protected, we risk
losing sight of the need to protect the forms of shallow privacy, taken
individually or in the aggregate, that comprise the ubiquity of everyday
privacy.
The ubiquity of shallow privacy, therefore, has both a quantitative and
qualitative aspect. The quantity of information we share across a range of
platforms and practices means that unfettered police access to third party
records opens the possibility of altering social practices that technology
otherwise makes available. As Danielle Citron and David Gray have
argued, focusing on the quantitative aspect of privacy protection enables
courts and policy makers to consider how indiscriminate surveillance
affects constitutionally protected liberties in the aggregate.52 The quality of
information, by contrast, is not simply a matter of whether it is undisclosed
or intimate—whether access to information invades reasonable expectations
of privacy—but what roles it plays in enabling the realization of personal
identity. Focusing on the quality of the information accessed, and the social
practices that depend on particular forms of sharing, enables courts and
policy makers to be sensitive to the actual nature of the information beyond
whether it is undisclosed.
Because the Supreme Court provides meaning to core constitutional
values, and because values can follow the development of social practices
and movements, legislatures can play an important role in pointing the way

51. HAVEL, supra note 12, at 120.
52. As they argue,
The threshold Fourth Amendment question should be whether a technology has
the capacity to facilitate broad and indiscriminate surveillance that intrudes
upon reasonable expectations of quantitative privacy by raising the specter of a
surveillance state if deployment and use of that technology is left to the
unfettered discretion of law enforcement officers or other government agents.
David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 7172 (2013).
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towards broader privacy protections and understandings.53 As it stands, the
Supreme Court’s current understanding of Fourth Amendment privacy is a
barrier to conceptualizing privacy as enabling personal identity. Legislative
standards for protecting privacy can lead the way. The LEATPR Standards
provide one model for doing so. But legislating such a framework becomes
possible only if decision makers adopt the attitudes and perspectives
entailed from recognition of privacy’s location in polymorphic and shared
social life.
If policy makers are to obtain any organized limits and control over
policing practices that access third party records, then some form of
contingent and contextual judgments must be made to determine when and
what can be accessed under which standards. The problem of contingency
leads to classificatory pressures. Privacy advocates would like to see more
information placed into the highest protected classifications, while law
enforcement pushes in the opposite direction.54 Because third party
information must be classified, normative considerations are inseparable
from factual claims. Deciding that information is highly private provides
the justification for limiting police access. By evaluating the nature of third
party information, prior commitments to understanding the scope and
meaning of privacy will determine outcomes. Thus, if forms of privacy—in
quality and quantity—are viewed as shallow within a framework that
prioritizes deep privacy, then different normative outcomes will follow
from a framework sensitive to privacy’s ubiquity in everyday life.
Law enforcement exerts two kinds of pressure on constitutional
protections for privacy: practically oriented downward pressure and
necessity based outward pressure. Practical considerations concerned with
preserving police practices exert downward pressure on the kinds of

53. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-69 (2005) (noting shifting
conceptions of cruel and unusual punishment in the states); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558, 573 (2003) (noting changing understandings of sexual orientation). On social
movements and changing constitutional understandings, see generally Jack M. Balkin &
Reva Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927 (2006);
Reva Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 191 (2008); Reva Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323 (2006).
54. Compare CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT
SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 79-117 (2007) (arguing for more regulation of
public surveillance), with Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413-14 (2013) (involving
law enforcement attempts to expand the use of dog sniffs to the home).
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practices that constitute searches for Fourth Amendment purposes.55
Necessity and exceptional circumstances exert pressure on courts to create
exemptions to the application of otherwise governing doctrinal rules.56
Downward pressures place more information in the least protected
categories. The first question of Fourth Amendment law is whether a form
of police investigative-looking constitutes a search.57 In order to avoid more
constraining constitutional rules, the Court has concluded that a number of
practices that would constitute searching in everyday parlance, do not rise
to the level of a constitutional search. For example, looking through a
person’s trash left by the street in accordance with municipal regulations is
not a search,58 nor is hovering over a person’s residential property from a
height of 400 feet in a helicopter to look through the roof of a greenhouse.59
Examining a person’s “open fields” is not constitutional searching,60 nor is
gathering information from third parties such as banks or telephone
providers with whom a person has “voluntarily” conveyed personal
information.61 At least as a general matter, Physically tracking a person’s
movements on public roadways does not constitute a search, even with
technological assistance.62 After the Supreme Court in United States v.
Jones held that placing a tracking device on a person’s vehicle constitutes
55. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (“A ‘canine sniff’ by a
well-trained narcotics detection dog . . . is much less intrusive than a typical search.”); see
also Christopher Slobogin, Why Crime Severity Analysis Is Not Reasonable, 97 IOWA L.
REV. BULL. 1, 4-6 (2012) (considering the prospect that altering the standard for searches
based on severity of the crime will lead to lower standards for more serious crimes).
56. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1522 (2012) (holding
that because of “the essential interest in readily administrable rules,” the Fourth Amendment
does not limit imposition of strip searches on those arrested for minor crimes); see also
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 (2011) (police-created exigency); California v.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (automobile exception); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
340-43 (1985) (special needs exception). The Court rejected a “murder scene exception” in
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (distinguishing looking
in open fields from observing areas within curtilage in deciding whether a search has
occurred).
58. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988).
59. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989).
60. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (“[O]pen fields do not provide
the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from
government interference or surveillance. There is no societal interest in protecting the
privacy of those activities, such as the cultivation of crops, that occur in open fields.”).
61. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
62. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983).
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an unconstitutional physical trespass,63 a key unresolved constitutional
question is whether specific forms of tracking, such as using a cell phone’s
GPS location data or short-term electronic monitoring of a person’s
movements, would constitute a Fourth Amendment search.64 When the
Court views restrictions on policing practices as too burdensome, the first
analytic step is to conclude that an investigatory technique is not a search.65
Outward pressure employs exigencies as ways to exit otherwise
applicable constitutional rules. If special circumstances or emergency
situations arise, then exceptions sometimes authorize police to act free from
normal legal constraints. When responding to violence unfolding in a home,
police may enter without a warrant, arrest persons, and conduct searches
incident to those arrests, despite the background rule stating otherwise.66
And when special needs have been asserted, such as enforcing immigration
laws near an international border67; ensuring compliance with licensing,
registration, and sobriety requirements when driving a vehicle68; or
enforcing compliance with anti-drug use policies for student athletes,69 the
Court has altered default rules to allow officials an exemption. Such
outward pressure comes from prioritizing the necessity of particular
circumstances over the ex ante governance of rules. In this dynamic,
constitutional principles serve as pre-commitments against which the
flexibility of necessity stands opposed.70 But the circumstantial contingency
of necessity provides flexibility at the risk of undermining constitutional
norms. The Court has held that strict enforcement of a rule requiring police
to obtain a warrant before entering a home to conduct a search would be
unreasonable when police have reason to fear evidence might be
destroyed.71 On this view, well-established exceptions must be carefully
safeguarded against the encroaching influence of constitutional rules.72
63. 132 S. Ct. 945, 950-51 (2012).
64. See In re Application of United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600,
615 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding no Fourth Amendment search when police acquire historical
cell site data of a person’s movements).
65. See, e.g., id.
66. See Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (stating that home entry
without a warrant is reasonable to render emergency aid).
67. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 545 (1976).
68. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
69. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995).
70. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 174 (2000).
71. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857 (2011) (“[A] rule that precludes the police
from making a warrantless entry to prevent the destruction of evidence whenever their
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Both forms of pressure would be brought to bear on any legislative
classificatory scheme designed to regulate police access to third party
records. Such pressure leads to descriptive defeasibility. Law enforcement
will argue that most third party records, perhaps apart from medical
records, are either not private or are minimally private, access to which
warrants little or no oversight. In this dynamic, policing priorities create
focused reasons to allow more access in the name of security.73 In this way,
downward pressure would exist in deciding how to classify information.
And classificatory decisions in turn rely on background conceptions of
privacy’s importance as compared to the claimed need and perceived
intrusion of policing practices.
Descriptive defeasibility is also evident in placing exigent circumstance
exceptions at the heart of a rule’s conceptualization. Commitments to
constitutional constraints are only as strong as the availability of claims of
necessity. By seeking to ensure freedom from constraint in particular
circumstances, policy makers reveal that their constitutional commitments
extend no further than the easy cases, when the inconvenience of protecting
privacy does not pinch too much. This constitutional hesitation is evident in
the recently adopted LEATPR Standards, which give ample regard to the
possibility of exigent circumstances.74 But so long as legal rules and
principles constrain what would otherwise be unfettered, episodic, and
circumstantial responses to perceived investigatory needs, they function as
self-binding guides on behalf of values and principles that might otherwise
go unrealized.75
In two nods to the uncertainty and complexity of police investigative
needs, the Standards grant purposive override to any of their prescriptions
for claims based on exigency and on the social cost of inhibiting the ability
to solve an “unacceptable amount of otherwise solvable or preventable
crime.”76 If constraints on police access to third party records pinch too
much, then, according to the LEATPR Standards, the practical exigencies
conduct causes the exigency would unreasonably shrink the reach of this well-established
exception to the warrant requirement.”).
72. See Thomas P. Crocker, Order, Technology, and the Constitutional Meanings of
Criminal Procedure, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 685, 716-19 (2013) [hereinafter
Crocker, Constitutional Meanings].
73. Of course, security is something the Fourth Amendment seeks to provide by
granting a right “to be secure,” though from a different risk—that of the state itself. See Jed
Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008).
74. See STANDARD 25-5.4.
75. See ELSTER, supra note 70, at 115-18.
76. STANDARD 25-4.2(b).
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should override privacy protections. Of course, social costs abound—both
in limiting and in freeing police discretion. How this determination of social
cost is made depends on prior decisions about which factors are relevant.
Imagine an alternative formulation of the social cost, one that does not
permit an investigatory exit from constitutional rules: if access to records
thought reflective of minimally private information (“shallow privacy”)
would unduly risk inhibiting First Amendment activities or risk
undermining other protected liberties, then legislatures should increase the
level of justification required for access. Because the social cost to privacy
is at least as great as the cost of losing investigatory advantage, whether we
choose to imbed an exigency exception or a privacy boost depends on prior
judgments about purposes and priorities.
In thinking about whether, or to what extent, courts or legislatures should
be sensitive to social costs, it is important to consider how interests are
checked by institutional design within constitutional structure. In the
conflict between privacy and security, which institution will check claims
of necessity? Under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court often takes
note of the interests of law enforcement in having bright line rules that are
easily administered and not unduly burdensome.77 These interests are
represented by law enforcement agencies backed by legislative
empowerment. Yet this same Court must also check law enforcement by
interposing constitutional constraints on investigation procedures.78
Similarly, the legislature represents the people’s desire to criminalize
various behaviors, charging the executive to implement and enforce
legislative will. At the same time, a legislature also has the institutional
power to check illegitimate policing practices. Citizens do not want law
enforcement to exercise illegitimate means when maintaining order and
security or investigating crime.79 Constitutional structure is thus divided on
the question of privacy. The governing institutions whose function is to
check investigatory zeal are the same institutions often inclined to authorize
it. Because privacy is a value shared by all, no particular group represents
77. See, e.g., Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) (“Courts
attempting to strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment balance thus credit the government’s
side with an essential interest in readily administrable rules.”).
78. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
79. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer et al., American Policing at a Crossroads:
Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 335, 349-56 (2011); Tom R. Tyler et al., Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects
in Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 365,
369-71 (2010).
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an insular minority against whom legislation warrants particular judicial
scrutiny.80 As a result, the pressures represented by an added layer of
“social cost” balancing also serve to make less visible the diffuse harms
privacy invasions impose, since the “social cost” to be measured is a further
calculation of what is lost through investigatory constraints.81
Successful implementation of any regulatory regime restricting law
enforcement access depends upon the background privacy conceptions at
hand. In some way, this structure is the companion to Milton Friedman’s
claim about emergency: “Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real
change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the
ideas that are lying around.”82 When police practices become visible as
problematic, the reforms undertaken will depend on what conceptions of
privacy and liberty we have at hand. It may also be the case that only a
crisis produced by excessive police practices will produce real change. It
can be all too easy to think that if one has nothing to hide, then one need not
worry about pervasive surveillance83—a claim that itself depends on the
invisibility of many surveillance techniques, especially those that gain
access to third party records.
Privacy’s ubiquity is paradoxically related to its visibility.84 The more
new forms of sharing with others in everyday life become visible, the more
privacy becomes vulnerable under the third party doctrine. At the same
time, the more visible police presence is in everyday life, the more salient
the intrusions on liberty and privacy become. A police officer on every
street corner or officers who follow persons wherever they go would make
visible the existence of a permeating police presence.85 By contrast, a police
80. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). Of course,
something similar could be said about equal protection or free speech—courts play a dual
role of institutional check and institutional authorization. But when it comes to privacy’s
ubiquity, the very conception of the value imbeds a tradeoff (privacy and security) in a way
that free speech does not, for example.
81. As the Standards note, “[B]ecause whereas law enforcement need for a type of
information will often rightly be evident and compelling, the effects of inadequately
regulating such access can be just as compelling, if often more diffuse and long-term.”
STANDARD 25-4.2(a) commentary.
82. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM xiv (2002).
83. See Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other Misunderstandings of
Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 748-53 (2007).
84. See Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 181, 191-92 (2008).
85. Attitudes about surveillance take into account the quantity of surveillance, not
simply the visibility of being seen in public. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 54, at 183-85; Jeremy
A. Blumenthal et al., The Multiple Dimensions of Privacy: Testing Lay “Expectations of

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2014

812

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:791

officer tracking a person through third party records, including real-time
cell site location data, does so unseen by the target. Yet, in other contexts, a
political society in which police officers are a ubiquitous presence is one
the Supreme Court has identified as a “police state.”86 In this way, privacy
protections depend on surveillance visibility. If officers were to follow
large numbers of people everywhere they went during a day, watching and
recording their movements, noting their associates, and listening to their
conversations, Americans would declare the existence of a police state and
demand political change. Such a judgment would in part reflect the
visibility of such policing practices and the discernible effects such a
permeating presence would have on social and political life. Though, to be
clear, nothing about such practices would violate present Supreme Court
understandings of Fourth Amendment constraints that place no restrictions
on public observations by law enforcement.87
Is privacy located in the deep recesses of personal life or the more
interactive world of social sharing? Does it depend on the priorities of
policing or the prevalence of interpersonal social practices? Where we
locate privacy in both conceptual analysis and social practice impacts the
legal conclusions we reach. In this way, privacy has a geography that law
shapes even as it charts.
III. Privacy’s Constraints: Constitutional and Conceptual
Constitutional restrictions apply when police interact with individuals,
seeking to ascertain whether perceived suspicious behavior indicates
criminal conduct. Although widespread use of “stop and frisk” techniques
has generated controversy,88 police are free to conduct temporary seizures
Privacy,” 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331 (2009); Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher,
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth Amendment Cases: An
Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and Permitted by Society”, 42 DUKE L.J.
727 (1993).
86. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948) (speaking of “the most
fundamental distinctions between our form of government, where officers are under the law,
and the police-state where they are the law”); see also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145,
171 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (speaking of the Fourth Amendment, Justice
Frankfurter noted “its important bearing in maintaining a free society and avoiding the
dangers of a police state”).
87. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-52 (1989); Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983).
88. See Floyd v. City of N.Y., 959 F. Supp. 2d 668 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Benjamin Weiser
& Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says City Will Settle Suits on Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31,
2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/nyregion/de-blasio-stop-and-
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and limited searches as part of their practice of maintaining street order.89
Police need not wait until criminal actions are complete, but may intervene
proactively to prevent criminal conduct.90 When combined with ordermaintenance policing practices inspired by a “broken windows”
perspective, the goal becomes to reduce low-level criminal behaviors such
as loitering, littering, and vagrancy in order to signal social intolerance for
criminal conduct. By adopting a zero-tolerance policy, police reinforce
community norms of law abidingness that in turn are thought to reduce the
prevalence of criminal conduct.91 No restrictions exist on the frequency or
distribution of such techniques so long as each encounter individually
complies with constitutional standards.92 Absent constitutional barriers,
order-maintenance policing becomes a low-cost and pervasive approach to
law enforcement practice.93 When conducting street patrols, police presence
frisk.html; Al Baker, City Minorities More Likely to Be Frisked: Increase in Police Stops
Fuels Intense Debate, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/05/13/nyregion/13frisk.html?pagewanted=all; see also Shannon Parker,
Independent Oversight Needed to Curb NYPD Stop and Frisk Abuse, Experts Say, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (May 30, 2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/blog/independent-oversightneeded-curb-nypd-stop-and-frisk-abuse-experts-say; Stop-and-Frisk Campaign: About the
Issues, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.nyclu.org/issues/racial-justice/stop-andfrisk-practices (last visited Jan. 28, 2014).
89. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1968).
90. Id. at 24. As the Supreme Court reasoned in Terry, “[W]e cannot blind ourselves to
the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of
violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest.” Id.; see also
Stephen A. Saltzburg, Terry v. Ohio, A Practically Perfect Doctrine, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV.
911, 952 (1998) (“The common sense of Terry is that law enforcement officers should not be
required to wait to act until a crime is complete, whereby society suffers a criminal
injury . . . .”).
91. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 349, 369 (1997) (“Visible disorder is a self-reinforcing cue about the community’s
attitude toward crime.”); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, Law and (Norms of) Order in
the Inner City, 32 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 805, 806 (1998) (“By shaping preferences for crime,
accentuating the perceived status of lawbreaking, and enfeebling the institutions that
normally hold criminal propensities in check, disorderly norms create crime.”). But see
BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF BROKEN WINDOWS
POLICING 7 (2001) (“After reviewing the available social-scientific data . . . I find that there
is no good evidence to support the broken windows theory.”).
92. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); Whren v. United States,
517 U.S. 806, 811-13 (1996). But see City of Chi. v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 63-64 (1999)
(holding frequently used ordinance against loitering was unconstitutionally vague).
93. See Crocker, Constitutional Meanings, supra note 72, at 735-39; Debra Livingston,
Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the
New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 653-59 (1997).
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is visible to citizens whose communities either cooperate in maintaining
social order or engage the political process to institute changes in practice.
But the consequences of police presence through digital media, or through
suspicious activity monitoring, is less visible and therefore more difficult
for citizens to check through political processes.
The digital “stop and frisk” becomes possible if police are allowed to
patrol social media as they do the streets and sidewalks.94 Like the tension
that exists between a free public sphere and stop and frisks, the digital stop
and frisk risks altering the experience of the public sphere for many
persons.95 First Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that a robust
public sphere is a necessary condition for successful democratic selfdetermination.96 When they see something suspicious, law enforcement
officers might inquire further, following a person across different platforms
containing third party information. The difference is that in a standard stop
and frisk the amount of information available to police is comparatively
limited—typically a person’s identity and whatever can be quickly
ascertained through consensual conversation.97 Even here, the information
accessible through police questioning is limited by an individual’s right to
decline to answer.98
But in a digital “stop and frisk,” police have a vast amount of additional
information at hand that also has the qualitative aspect of providing more
detailed information about a person’s identity. Personal beliefs, habits,
associations, and activities can be easily compiled to form a third person
94. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 29-30; see also, Ian Urbina, Social Media, a Trove of Clues
and Confessions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2014, at SR5, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2014/02/16/sunday-review/social-media-a-trove-of-clues-and-confessions.html?_r=0.
95. Such “transactional surveillance” or “digital dossiers” have the capacity to alter
social participation and experience. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 54, at 168-203 (“transaction
surveillance”); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 165-209 (2004) (“digital dossiers”).
96. See, e.g., Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 696
(1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (“Public places are of necessity the locus for
discussion of public issues . . . . At the heart of our jurisprudence lies the principle that in a
free nation citizens must have the right to gather and speak with other persons in public
places.”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the purpose of the
First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail . . . .”).
97. See Hiibel v. Sixth Jud. Dist. Ct. of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 185-89
(2004).
98. See, e.g., Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 497-98 (1983) (“The person approached, however, need not answer any question put to
him; indeed, he may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way.”).
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narrative about a person’s identity. Through an extended digital “stop and
frisk,” police can ascertain a person’s religious, political, and sexual
orientations, in addition to one’s reading, traveling, and shopping
proclivities.99 The digital “stop and frisk” also can be of greater temporal
duration. The amount of time police may detain a person on the street is
limited to the scope of the reasonable suspicion that justifies the temporary
seizure in the first instance.100 But there are no comparable temporal limits
of police inquiry into the digital person.
This one example illustrates how difficult it is to import questions and
issues from everyday policing into the electronic context. When an officer
confronts an individual on the street, the stop is relevant to a suspicion
articulable at the outset of the encounter.101 It is an encounter with a definite
end, identifiable by citizen and police alike. But the digital stop and frisk
has neither this symmetry nor the limits imposed by reasonableness and
relevance. Thus, police monitoring of social media is not at all like police
monitoring of city streets. Nor is access to digital records, as a general
matter, on par with access to specific data such as phone records for a
specific time period.102 In this way, a key precedent, Smith v. Maryland,103
often cited to justify broad authority to examine third party records for
which individuals have no expectation of privacy,104 does not readily
apply.105 Neither the quality nor the quantity of data available to many
searches of social media or other forms of third party records is sufficiently
analogous to the pen register data found to reside outside Fourth
Amendment protections in Smith.106 The amount of added content available,
in addition to the persons to whom that content is made available, is a far

99. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 389 (2008).
100. See, e.g., Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (concluding a lawful seizure
occurs “so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop”);
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (examining “whether the police diligently
pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions
quickly”).
101. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
102. Though even here, the amount of information a police officer might acquire in a
street stop and frisk will likely be much smaller than the constitutionally ungoverned check
of a person’s financial records.
103. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
104. Id. at 743-44.
105. See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 31 (D.D.C. 2013). But see ACLU v.
Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 750-52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
106. 442 U.S. at 742-43.
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more powerful view of a person’s identity, history, and current projects
than either phone records or brief street conversations in isolation.107
Personal history is both about who we are as persons as well as who
others construe us to be. It is in the nature of personal identity that there is
no single answer to the question of who one is. Although questions of
personal identity invite nettlesome philosophical issues, one important
aspect is often thought to be maintaining the continuity of a person’s
experiences and relations to others.108 We are, in important respects, our
histories. But histories can be ambiguous, the full meaning of which is open
to future articulation as experiences lead to further narrative refinements
about who a person is through the actions and beliefs that sustain the person
through time. The further back in a personal history one goes, the more
attenuated some of the information might become, and the less accurate a
third party’s construction of the person’s identity, motives, and dispositions
might become. Police access to historical data requires interpretation, and
the further removed from context the information is, the more misleading
the data can be. Moreover, the more incomplete the data, the more
interpretive freedom the police have to construe the meaning of prior
events.109 But investigative police work is not always about prosecutions. It
is often about social order, involving discretion, and backed by general
statutes about public order that can be employed almost at will.110

107. As Judge Richard Leon concludes in analyzing surveillance activity of the National
Security Agency, “I am convinced that the surveillance program now before me is so
different from a simple pen register that Smith is of little value in assessing whether the Bulk
Telephony Metadata Program constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.” Klayman, 957 F.
Supp. 2d at 32. `
108. See, e.g., MACINTYRE, supra note 24, at 190; DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS
281-306 (1984); BERNARD WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 46-63 (1973). See generally
PERSONAL IDENTITY (John Perry ed., 1975).
109. A similar danger from pervasive surveillance is that ordinary behavior may amplify
state power, “adding information to databases that makes inferences more powerful and
effective. Our behavior may tell things about us that we may not even know about
ourselves.” Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 13 (2008).
110. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces:
Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 YALE L. J. 1165 (1996); Meares
& Kahan, supra note 91; see also Tracey M. Meares, The Good Cop: Knowing the
Difference Between Lawful or Effective Policing and Rightful Policing—And Why It Matters,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1865, 1870 (2013) (“Broad discretion allows police to shape,
redescribe, and recategorize situations and contexts in ways that defy strictly defined codes,
so that attempts to specify strict rule compliance seem somewhat misfitting.”).
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Police investigation of the First Amendment protected activities of
Occupy Wall Street activists in New York City during 2011 illustrates well
the significance of this link between unregulated access to greater quantities
and quality of electronic data.111 Using access to social media, which under
current Supreme Court jurisprudence is non-protected information,112 New
York City police (and police in other cities) tracked and followed Occupy
Wall Street activists.113 Ascertaining their planned protest-related activities,
New York police intervened, preemptively in many cases, to disrupt
organizing activities and to prevent the exercise of freedom of association
and public speech.114 They intervened with arrests not for serious crime, but
for “obstructing governmental administration,” as the New York Times
reported.115 The digital stop and frisk was not for the purposes of
investigating a conspiracy to obstruct “governmental administration,” nor
could it be based on a particular suspicion that a particular individual was
engaged in criminal activity. Rather, the purpose was to monitor the
political activities of a particular group.116 The decision to exercise legal
authority to intervene and prevent political activity came later—and at the
discretion of the police officer now on the street backed by a profile of the
person’s identity gleaned through third party records. It is not difficult to
imagine a similar scenario in which officers monitor a planned political
gathering to which many individuals will travel by car. To forestall the
111. See, e.g., Michael S. Schmidt & Colin Moynihan, F.B.I. Counterterrorism Agents
Monitored Occupy Movement, Records Show, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2012, at A18, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/25/nyregion/occupy-movement-was-investigated-by-fbi-cou
nterterrorism-agents-records-show.html; see also Bernard E. Harcourt, Occupy Wall Street’s
‘Political Disobedience’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2011), available at http://opinionator.blogs.ny
times.com/2011/10/13/occupy-wall-streets-political-disobedience/; Mattathias Schwartz, PreOccupied: The Origins and Future of Occupy Wall St., NEW YORKER (Nov. 28, 2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/11/28/111128fa_fact_schwartz?currentPage=all.
112. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979). Such information would likely fall
under the category of minimally protected or unprotected data according to the Standards.
See LEATPR STANDARDS, supra note 9, at 13-14.
113. Colin Moynihan, Wall Street Protesters Complain of Police Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2012, at A17, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/12/nyregion/
occupy-wall-street-protesters-complain-of-police-monitoring.html?_r=0.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Similar activities led to legislative reform of government power to conduct domestic
surveillance. The FBI engaged in a Counter Intelligence Program (COINTELPRO)
beginning in the 1950s in which it conducted covert surveillance of anti-war and civil rights
groups, among others, leading to an eventual Senate investigation lead by Senator Church.
See S. REP. 94-755, at 1-2 (1976).
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success of the planned activities, police have at their discretion the ability to
pull over any car at practically any time for violation of some traffic rule
(e.g., deviating in a lane) and where authorized, to make an arrest for minor
misdemeanor offenses.117 In other contexts, the Supreme Court has limited
the discretion of police by striking down vague public order statutes as
violating due process and the First Amendment.118
In the Occupy Wall Street intervention, the relevance of the third party
records access was unrelated to the eventual justifications for arresting
individuals. If we focus only upon the synchronic and episodic moment of
the traffic stop and the subsequent arrest, then the only question is whether
the police had legal justification—in this case probable cause—for their
actions. The fact that the stop was a pretense on behalf of other purposes is
a fact that is invisible under the Court’s current Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.119 The surrounding context—how the police came to be in a
position to make a seizure or conduct a search—does not affect, according
to the Court, the legitimacy of the search or seizure.120 In this way, prior
investigatory techniques or actions are disconnected from subsequent police
actions. Targeting political groups for surveillance of constitutionally
protected activity for discretionary misdemeanor-based interventions has
not affected the legality of those interventions under the Fourth
Amendment—even if they are pretextual and designed to suppress activities
police have no direct authority to suppress. If the police surveillance can be
shown to disrupt or deter the exercise of free speech, it might constitute a
cognizable First Amendment injury.121 But short of that, according to the
117. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 327 (2001). Use of pretense, and
outright misconduct, are part of the story of how Occupy organizers were treated. See, e.g.,
Jason Cherkis & Zach Carter, FBI Surveillance of Occupy Wall Street Detailed,
HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 5, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/05/fbi-occupywall-street_n_2410783.html; Matthew Rothschild, Spying on Occupy Activists,
PROGRESSIVE, June 2013, http://progressive.org/spying-on-ccupy-activists.
118. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-69 (1972);
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 394 U.S. 147, 153 (1969).
119. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354.
120. See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1857-61 (2011) (rejecting analysis of
police created exigent circumstances); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383-85 (2007)
(rejecting consideration of whether police should cease pursuit of motorist in determining
the reasonableness of deadly force); Atwater, 532 U.S. at 354 (“If an officer has probable
cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his
presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.”).
121. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972)
(“Official surveillance, whether its purpose be criminal investigation or ongoing intelligence
gathering, risks infringement of constitutionally protected privacy of speech.”). The
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Court, we “assume the risk” that our acts of sharing render us vulnerable to
police who may access what we have shared.122 In this respect, police are
said to be no different than any other member of the public who can
observe our public movements and receive information third parties choose
to reveal.123
Who is being targeted, what kinds of activities are being targeted, and
how much the access police seek relates to constitutionally protected
liberties versus how much relates to criminal activity are among the
questions relevant to preventing law enforcement from using minor
offenses as a pretext for suppressing political activity. When the
justification for searching third party records is based on a lower standard
of reasonable suspicion, there is a greater risk that the grounds for the
investigation may be disconnected from the eventual exercise of
discretionary authority to enforce traffic stops, “obstructing governmental
administration,” and the like. This risk is related to both the quality and
quantity of information available that can be used against individuals based
on government officials’ judgments about the value and desirability of the
underlying free speech, or otherwise protected, activities. Of course,
inadvertence when conducting a justified search does not undermine the
ability for police to seize evidence for use in a related criminal arrest.124 The
search for drugs backed by a warrant that uncovers an illegally possessed
handgun is not an invalid search merely because the evidence found was
not purposefully sought.

Supreme Court indicated, while not holding, that the First Amendment could be violated by
government presence at public meetings. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (suggesting
that “constitutional violations may arise from the deterrent, or ‘chilling,’ effect of
governmental regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First
Amendment rights”). Lower courts have followed this approach. See, e.g., Alliance to End
Repression v. City of Chi., 627 F. Supp. 1044, 1055-56 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Handschu v.
Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766, 770-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
122. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984) (“It is well settled that
when an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the risk that his
confidant will reveal that information to the authorities.”); see also Mary I. Coombs, Shared
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, or the Rights of Relationships, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1593,
1648-50 (1987); Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty, supra note 42, at 48-56.
123. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (“[P]olice cannot reasonably
be expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that could have been
observed by any member of the public.”); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82
(1983).
124. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,
326 (1987).
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But the issue of the scope and quality of third party records searches is
different. First, pressure exists to treat cyberspace like streetscapes,125
allowing police to rove at will through social networks with lowered
standards of justification for targeting individuals for further inquiry. Social
media sharing is a form of shallow privacy that enables the development of
beliefs and opinions necessary for personal identity. Second, the quality and
quantity of information law enforcement can acquire increases the risks that
law enforcement will use access to social media records to harass and
suppress disfavored groups and activities—risks associated in American
history with the general warrants the Fourth Amendment proscribes.126
Third, because law enforcement may occupy social media, the use and trust
individuals place in their communications changes, creating a risk of
chilling free expression and associational liberties that the Constitution
otherwise protects.127 In light of these risks, placing the standard for access
even to so-called “minimally private” information lower than probable
cause too easily allows the digital stop and frisk to undermine protected
liberties.
Context matters to the liberties that privacy sustains. At present,
synchronic analysis of police conduct does not recognize how action that
seems reasonable under a narrow context can be unreasonable in light of
additional contextual facts.128 In assessing Fourth Amendment
reasonableness, the Supreme Court focuses only upon the moment when a

125. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
126. In a related case involving searches of computer databases for specific files, the
Ninth Circuit noted that the “pressing need of law enforcement for broad authorization to
examine electronic records . . . creates a serious risk that every warrant for electronic
information will become, in effect, a general warrant, rendering the Fourth Amendment
irrelevant.” United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1176 (9th
Cir. 2010). See generally, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625-26 (1886) (explaining
historical foundations for the Fourth Amendment as a response to “grievous abuses,”
“[p]rominent and principal among these was the practice of issuing general warrants.”).
127. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(discussing how the mode of observation in and of itself can have a deleterious effect on the
relationship between society and government).
128. See David Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass: The Pitfalls
and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH.
381, 399 (2013); Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones in a
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL’Y 1, 24-25 (2012). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth
Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012) (undercutting the mosaic theory approach to
regulating police searches).
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search or seizure occurs, purporting to ignore broader contextual factors.129
But, judgments about reasonable expectations of privacy, or judgments
about the reasonableness of police action in particular circumstances,
require context. The only question is how broadly to construe the context.130
By taking a synchronic approach, the Court chooses to look narrowly at
context. Categorizing standards of law enforcement access based on the
social practices in which information is embedded is already a contextual
approach, albeit one focused on the practices of personal sharing or
withholding.131 What is needed is consideration of the context of the uses to
which law enforcement might put information gained through broad access
to third party records.
Whether information is deep or shallow, police access should require
probable cause when the search of third party records gives information
about activities and associations that can be used to target individuals for
discretionary intervention unrelated to the justification for access to the
information. The First Amendment models such restrictions when it forbids
state officials from compelled disclosure of membership lists when there is
a risk of chilling the exercise of associational freedoms.132 Such requests for
disclosure would reveal the same kinds of information available from third
party records, to which public officials may have unregulated access. It
cannot be the case that the value the Court attaches to the “collective effort

129. See Kerr, supra note 128, at 320-43; see also supra note 120 and accompanying
text.
130. See, e.g., Gray & Citron, supra note 128, at 427-28 (recognizing the contingency of
doctrinal decisions regarding timeframes under mosaic theory); Slobogin, supra note 128 , at
16-17 (suggesting that courts aggregate the time of investigation to determine whether a
search has occurred).
131. What makes an expectation of privacy reasonable under the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence depends on the context. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S.
35, 40 (1988) (relying on “common knowledge” and regular practice to ascertain whether
“society is prepared to accept” an expectation of privacy as reasonable).
132. As the Court declared,
[C]ompelled disclosure of petitioner’s Alabama membership is likely to affect
adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective
effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate, in that
it may induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others
from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their
associations and of the consequences of this exposure.
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958); see also Katherine J.
Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of
Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741 (2008).
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to foster beliefs”133 through associations depends on the method by which
public officials acquire the information. Under the First Amendment, what
matters is the possession and use of such information by government
officials. In this way, the standard for access does not vary based on the
nature of the crime; rather, the standard considers the contextual uses to
which law enforcement might put the information.134
Law enforcement that seeks to solve a particular crime by examining a
suspect’s social media records is different than law enforcement
surveillance of social media as if it were a busy street corner, which in turn
is different than monitoring the activities of a particular social and political
group because of a believed heightened risk that they may engage in
disorderly behavior in pursuit of their political goals. When probable cause
exists to think that examination of third party records will produce evidence
of a crime, then there is a lowered concern about inappropriate targeting of
groups and individuals for surveillance and harassment. But when there
need only be suspicion that the groups or individuals might disrupt public
order in some minor way in pursuit of their associational freedoms, then
there is a far greater risk of inappropriate targeting on the basis of political
views, as the Occupy episode illustrates.135 This risk exists no matter
whether the records reveal deep or shallow forms of privacy. Indeed, the
risk seems greatest regarding shallow forms of privacy, for these are the
contexts of sharing that are necessary for political association, the very
contexts that a stultifying police state undermines, as Václav Havel’s
commentary illustrates.136
The standard for access to third party records thus varies based on the
protected liberties impacted by the nature of the use and its relevance to
legitimate justifications for law enforcement access. Targeting individuals
for enforcement of traffic laws or public order should not require access to
133. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 463.
134. By considering how the use of information impacts the privacy of persons, this
approach harmonizes with the quantitative privacy approach, which, in determining whether
police access constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, asks “[w]hether those technologies
have the capacity to facilitate the sorts of broad programs of indiscriminate surveillance that
raise constitutional concerns about a surveillance state.” Gray & Citron, supra note 52, at
126.
135. As Professor Simitis argues, “Neither freedom of speech nor freedom of association
nor freedom of assembly can be fully exercised as long as it remains uncertain whether,
under what circumstances, and for what purposes, personal information is collected and
processed.” Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV.
707, 734 (1987).
136. HAVEL, supra note 12, at 120.
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third party records of internet usage, social media content, or even cell-cite
information. And targeting individuals for their political activities already
violates their First Amendment rights.137 Lowered standards, such as
relevance to an investigation, do not afford the protections against roving,
barely fettered surveillance of groups and individuals—including their
transactions, associations, and liberties—that risks altering and harming the
ubiquity of privacy. While awaiting Supreme Court recognition that
unconstrained access to third party records renders persons insecure in their
political liberty, legislatures have independent authority to protect privacy’s
ubiquity as a constitutional value. In this way, the ABA Standards could be
understood to invite new constitutional understandings through legislative
means in advance of judicial pronouncements. Constitutional meanings
need not await judicial determinations in order to put them into legal
practice.
Limiting access to the ubiquity of electronic records of persons’ social
and political interactions with others increases the risk of potential
disorderly conduct or other minor, and politically motivated, civil
disobedient behavior going undetected. It may even increase the risk of
missing the mosaic of information that might identify a potential violent
offender in advance of his crime. Law enforcement combined with counterterrorism efforts synthesize information through regional fusion centers in
part on a theory that somewhere in the vast amount of transactional data
about individuals is the clue to the next major terrorist attack.138 But this is
the price a free political society should be willing to pay in order to
guarantee that the processes of deliberative self-determination will be
137. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock
principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”).
138. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, Network Accountability for the
Domestic Intelligence Apparatus, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1441, 1443 (2011); David E. Pozen,
Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 YALE
L.J. 628, 650 (2005). Technological capacity enables this “mosaic approach” and official
risk-aversion of another attack motivates it, as President Obama explained: “[T]he
combination of increased digital information and powerful supercomputers offers
intelligence agencies the possibility of sifting through massive amounts of bulk data to
identify patterns or pursue leads that may thwart impending threats.” President Barack
Obama, Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence (Jan. 17, 2014),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-rev
iew-signals-intelligence. However, “the men and women at the NSA know that if another
9/11 or massive cyber-attack occurs, they will be asked, by Congress and the media, why
they failed to connect the dots.” Id.
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“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”139 Placing the burden otherwise
creates an unjustified risk of suppressing political speech that in turn
diminishes the legitimacy and efficacy of democratic self-governance.140 In
this way, legislative standards can lead constitutional doctrine to develop a
broader, diachronic justificatory framework for analyzing police searches.
Political speech and association begins with the ubiquity of privacy. Our
private thoughts, which Justice Brandeis called the “freedom to think as you
will,”141 are intertwined with our public speech through which we engage in
critical thinking and opinion formation.142 Therefore, when the state
interferes with the processes of belief formation, it undermines the integrity
of First Amendment protected activities.
In this way, the boundaries of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence shape
the efficacy of First Amendment activities.143 This relation has been
recognized by members of the Court, both past and present. Justice
Sotomayor takes up the claim Justice Douglas repeated to no avail in a prior
era, noting in United States v. Jones that “[a]wareness that the Government
may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”144
Moreover, pervasive surveillance may “alter the relationship between
citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.”145
139. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
140. Such a doctrinal approach would be in tension with law enforcement tendencies to
view political movements and activities with criminal suspicion. An earlier era of law
enforcement abuses were examined by the Church Committee and led to some legal reform.
See S. REP. 94-755 (1976). The tendencies, however, appear to be unreformed, as evidenced
by investigations of the Occupy Wall Street protesters. See Moynihan, supra note 113, at
A17.
141. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring),
overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
142. See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of
Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 283 (2011).
143. The Fourth Amendment protects a broader conception of political liberty modeled
on the liberty protected by due process in cases such as Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003). In so doing, the Fourth Amendment can protect the interactions of persons in the
public sphere. See Crocker, Political Fourth Amendment, supra note 39, at 307. The First
and Fourth Amendments can be mutually informing in the other direction as well. See, e.g.,
Marc Jonathan Blitz, Stanley in Cyberspace: Why the Privacy Protection of the First
Amendment Should Be More Like That of the Fourth, 62 HASTINGS L. J. 357 (2010).
144. 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 762 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S.
323, 343 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (warning of “a society in which government may
intrude into the secret regions of man’s life at will”).
145. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting United States v.
Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011) (Flaum, J., concurring)).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/5

2014]

UBIQUITOUS PRIVACY

825

As the Supreme Court colorfully put the point in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”146 But
maintaining order in the public sphere through monitoring of third party
records, if unchecked, fails to align the security and liberty protected by the
Fourth Amendment with the freedom to speak protected by the First.147
Political action is coordinated action. Under free speech principles,
individuals must remain free to discuss the matters of critical importance as
well as the frivolous, for social interactions and practices should determine
prevailing viewpoints, not the local police officer or other “petty”
official.148 Dissent is only possible if privacy is protected—both deep and
shallow in Havel’s terms.149
In occupying social media by standing in the place of the third parties
with whom we all share information as conditions of everyday life, local
government administrators through their police can impose their own
conception of proper social and political order. In order to forestall the use
of traffic stops or arrests for “obstructing governmental administration” to
impede free speech activities, courts and legislatures need to include
contextual factors when considering the justification for police action. In
doing so, they should raise the standard for access to third party records to a
standard of probable cause when the targeted activities include core
political speech—regardless of whether the content of the information

146. 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
147. See Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 112, 143-45 (2007); see also, Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0’s
Promise with Robust Privacy Protections, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822, 829-39 (2010).
148. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971) (“[T]he immediate consequence
of this freedom may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive
utterance. These are, however, within established limits, in truth necessary side effects of the
broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us to achieve.”); see also
Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1410 (1986);
Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 262.
149. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 10
(1999) (“The First Amendment has a special regard for those who swim against the current,
for those who would shake us to our foundations, for those who reject prevailing
authority.”); Thomas P. Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of “Place” in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2587, 2587 (2007); see also, Heather K.
Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745 (2005).
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gained from electronic records is classified as private to a high or low
degree.
The First Amendment exemplifies this type of heightened scrutiny when
the activities the state impacts are core political activities.150 If government
action burdens the expression of ideas because of its content, then it must
meet the rigid standard of strict scrutiny.151 Even general regulations that
have non-content based, incidental burdens on free expression, such as
regulations involving time, place, and manner restrictions, receive
heightened scrutiny.152
Thus, the question is not simply whether the police are seeking evidence
of a crime—no matter how minor or serious—but whether in seeking to
investigate a crime by accessing third party records the police have a high
risk of engaging in suppression of political speech.153 By requiring a
heightened showing of probable cause to believe a specific crime is being
committed for which searching particular third party records is relevant, the
police are foreclosed from using reasonable suspicion as a generalized
warrant to examine claimed suspicious activity.154 Patrolling streetscapes is

150. The Standards do a good job emphasizing the implications of records access for
freedoms like speech and association, recognizing that “privacy is a critical component of
many fundamental rights.” STANDARD 25-3.3 commentary; see also Meyer v. Grant, 486
U.S. 414, 421 (1988) (“The First Amendment ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.’” (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
151. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 115 (1991); Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
152. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Clark v. Cmty.
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
153. The issue here is not changing the level of justification needed to conduct searches
based on the severity of the crime. Rather, the issue is raising the level of scrutiny when the
more specific, constitutionally protected activities of speech and association are implicated
by police access to “less private” social media and third party records. Compare Jeffrey
Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing
Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2011) (arguing courts should
consider the severity of a crime in determining if a search is reasonable), with Slobogin,
supra note 55 (opining that severity analysis would backfire, resulting in less protection than
the present).
154. A principal purpose of the Fourth Amendment is prohibiting general warrants,
which British officers used against American colonialists. See Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886), rejected by Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967); see also NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 68-69 (1937); Thomas Y. Davies,
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 562-70 (1999); William

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss4/5

2014]

UBIQUITOUS PRIVACY

827

not the same as patrolling cyberspaces. The digital stop and frisk is not the
same as a sidewalk stop and frisk.
A necessary condition for the possibility of self-governance is the liberty
to form a self through interactions with others. When police have access to
those forms of sharing, unfettered from purposes carefully constrained by
legitimate needs, there is a risk to both self and society.155 Personal identity
is often not about a self in isolation, for important aspects of our personal
identities are formed through our associations. Thus, the intertwining of
personal identity with others—our shared narratives—are vulnerable to
pervasive surveillance. Whether policy makers use the classifications of
high or low, deep or shallow, a conception of privacy protected from
unconstrained police access is important to understanding why and how to
construct such constraints.
Privacy’s ubiquity therefore has two important aspects. One is the
proliferation of shared information that reflects and enables the
development of personal identity. The other is the multiple ways that acts of
sharing are part of forming a political self, capable of exercising critical
thought and fulfilled through forms of collective action in concert with
others. In neither case is privacy a condition of nondisclosure, and in both
cases privacy is a function of constitutional limitations on the domains in
which government may intrude. In this way, expectations of privacy are not
merely subjective or even social. They are political. Both aspects fall under
the protection of the First Amendment. And each aspect has a strong basis
for protection under the Fourth Amendment.
When a legislature considers the LEATPR recommendations, it does so
against the background of the most salient constitutional and conceptual
constraints on privacy. State constitutionalism can have a role to play in
contributing to the legal protections afforded privacy. But it can do so only
by recognizing how privacy is connected to other core constitutional values
implicated by law enforcement access to third party records.
The temptation is to say that we have all already given up the game. That
with all the social sharing in which many people engage, the time is already
past to provide new protections for privacy. Moreover, despite the
differences between cyberspaces and streetscapes, many people may be
inclined to say that if a person reveals information to others, the police
should not be disabled more than any other member of the public from

J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 396-411
(1995).
155. See Richards, supra note 25, at 1935.
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gaining access to that information. These are contestable value judgments
that depend on contestable conceptions of privacy—conceptions this article
seeks to analyze through recognition of privacy’s ubiquity in everyday life.
Motivation to adopt new frameworks for protecting privacy as modeled by
the LEATPR Standards requires adopting attitudes and perspectives
informed by such recognition.
IV. Conclusion
By creating a framework for protecting against unregulated law
enforcement access to third party records, policy makers can begin to make
privacy more than the occasional value to which courts gesture when
claiming to balance liberty against the security needs of police.156 Because
privacy as a form of sharing is a practice as ubiquitous as the third parties
with whom we all share, how law conceptualizes privacy and its relation to
third party records shapes the practices of privacy. Moreover, the role of
third party records within the comprehensive pursuit of individual liberty,
as Justice Brandeis eloquently described, is “that freedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile.”157 How we conceptualize privacy is also related to the
law’s frame of reference. Do legal doctrines seek to facilitate the needs of
police or the protections of privacy? Only by prioritizing the latter can legal
decision makers create effective constraints on law enforcement access to
the growing body of third party records.158 When social costs reemerge in
the midst of thinking about how to protect a domain of privacy free from
unconstrained law enforcement access, they do so at the behest of police,
not personal privacy. Protecting privacy, by contrast, requires having at the
forefront a model of privacy as an important aspect to a system of
constitutionally protected liberties. In this way, how courts and legislatures
156. When purporting to balance liberties and security, “no one but a fool thinks that the
threat from the state is zero.” Jeremy Waldron, Security and Liberty: The Image of Balance,
11 J. POL. PHIL. 191, 208 (2003).
157. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring),
overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see also Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The makers of our
Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone -the most comprehensive of rights, and the right most valued by civilized men.”), overruled
in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
158. See Crocker, Political Fourth Amendment, supra note 39, at 303.
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understand the meanings and relations of Fourth and First Amendment
rights shapes future application of those rights.159 Courts and legislatures
need the guidance that articulations of constitutional values provide. In the
case of civil liberties, constitutional values are norms for the practice and
protection of privacy’s ubiquity.
Whether legislatures or courts take the lead, by making visible the core
privacy values at stake, decisions about how to weigh and measure
tradeoffs with order and security require consideration of the consequences
for social practice and personal identity. When it comes to privacy’s
relation to association, speech, and everyday sharing, these values are easily
overlooked because of their ubiquity. What is everywhere is difficult to see,
for it lacks a discernible site on which to focus. The home has served this
purpose for the Fourth Amendment, becoming the paradigm of space
protected from the insecurity of unreasonable searches.160 The ever-present
privacy of our sharing as a condition of everyday life renders us vulnerable
only to the degree that we fail to match the institutional pressures of
policing with commitments to the constitutional values of liberty and
privacy—in speech, association, and in the formation of our personal
identities in pursuit of self-government.

159. See Crocker, Constitutional Meanings, supra note 72, at 688.
160. As the Court explains, “At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his
own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” Silverman v.
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40
(2001); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 (1984); Stephanie M. Stern, The Inviolate
Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 912-13
(2010).
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